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Social media and digital technology offer immense potential for citizens, 
policymakers and practitioners to raise awareness of, monitor, and respond 
to violence. With Kenya’s elections approaching, technology can help to raise 
awareness of insecurity, support early warning, combat incitement of violence 
and promote accountability. However, digital technology also carries a number 
of risks. To maximise effectiveness and inclusivity, 1) greater support must be 
given to locally legitimate peace messaging and counter-speech; 2) government, 
media and civil society should collaborate to improve transparency and accountability 
in the regulation of online activity; and 3) social media monitoring of violence 
should be undertaken in conjunction with other reporting systems that seek to 
overcome inequalities in digital access and use.
 Using Digital and Social Media 
 to Monitor and Reduce Violence 
 in Kenya’s Elections
A new panacea?
Social media and digital technologies 
are transforming the way the public, civil 
society and policymakers engage with 
information about violence, and how 
that information is captured, analysed 
and acted upon. 
Social media platforms allow members 
of the public to share information 
on insecurity, and widespread access 
to mobile phones enables individuals 
to produce and disseminate much 
more immediate and detailed audio, 
visual and textual reports of violence 
than previously possible. These new 
information and communication tools 
have been key in spreading awareness 
of insecurity, and supporting efforts to 
monitor, and respond to, violence in a 
range of contexts.
In Kenya, the use of WhatsApp, Twitter 
and Facebook to communicate has 
transformed the information landscape, 
and been used to raise awareness or 
promote peace messaging in the face of 
uncertainty, rumour and threat. Similarly, 
purpose-built digital systems for violence 
reporting, monitoring, and crisis response, 
have proliferated in recent years.
At the same time, after an initial period 
of uncritical optimism regarding the 
potential of technology to promote 
peace, there is now growing recognition 
of its limitations. Social media and digital 
technology can be used to incite violence 
and spread hate speech, features that 
have been well-documented in Kenya’s 
past elections. Equally, even well-intentioned 
initiatives relying on social media and 
digital technologies to monitor and 
respond to violence can exclude or 
marginalise the voices of the vulnerable. 
This briefing explores the contrasting roles 
of social media and digital technology 
in Kenya’s elections; and proposes 
recommendations for policymakers 
and practitioners in related fields to 
inform and improve violence monitoring 
initiatives and ultimately reduce and 
better respond to violent crises.
Social media and digital 
technology in Kenya
Social media and digital technology are 
the latest frontier in political engagement, 
serving to facilitate communication 
between leaders and the public, bring 
political processes closer to the people, 
and mobilise political participation.
“Social media 
monitoring of 
violence should 
be undertaken in 
conjunction with 
other reporting 
systems that seek 
to overcome 
inequalities in 
digital access 
and use.”
This evolving role has been facilitated by the 
rapid spread of mobile phone and internet 
usage in Kenya over the past 15 years. Estimates 
suggest there are currently 39.6 million 
internet users and 31.9 million phone users 
in the country. Popular social media platforms 
include WhatsApp (with an estimated 
10 million users), Facebook (6.1 million), and 
Twitter (2.2 million monthly active users). 
Informal coalitions of Twitter users, commonly 
referred to as ‘Kenyans on Twitter’ #KOT, 
have been instrumental in influencing online 
public participation in policymaking, 
sometimes engaging in fierce critique of 
political processes and policymakers.
Threat conveyer and violence mobiliser
The rapid spread of these technologies also 
carries significant risks, including facilitating the 
rapid and widespread dissemination of rumours, 
threats, hate messages and calls to violence.
In Kenya, the 2007 presidential elections saw 
the dissemination of hateful language through 
multiple media outlets. However, these 
elections were the first in Kenya to see this 
occur via ‘new’ media (social media, mobile 
phones, and online platforms), alongside ‘old’ 
(radio, television and print). This included SMS 
bulk messaging through mobile phones, as 
well as e-mail, blogs, and social networking 
platforms. After the presidential election 
results were announced, the internal security 
minister announced a ban on live broadcasts. 
Given the news blackout, text messages 
became the primary means by which people 
updated each other on the election and its 
fallout. This was double-edged: while SMS 
was used to rally support for peace and raise 
awareness of insecurity, it was also used to 
spread hate and incite further violence. 
As the 2017 elections approach, the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) 
is mandated with fostering unity and tackling 
hate speech propagated on both ‘old’ and 
‘new’ media platforms. The NCIC has actively 
pursued hate speech suspects, summoning 
politicians allegedly engaged in incitement. This 
has suppressed incitement in public political 
discourse, such as in politicians’ and aspirants’ 
speeches, and in official campaign material. 
However, digital and social media provide 
new ways to spread inflammatory messages, 
sometimes discreetly or anonymously. Over 
the years, WhatsApp has become one of 
the most popular platforms in Kenya. This 
closed messaging system is more private, 
and not open to online monitoring. Thus, 
people may be less cautious about what 
they post in groups of friends, neighbours or 
close networks. Hence, harmful content on 
WhatsApp is rarely reported to authorities, 
and is very difficult to monitor independently.
The NCIC also monitors hate speech online 
and collaborates with operators and the police 
to investigate alleged incidents. However, it 
has not yet successfully prosecuted any person 
on hate speech, due in part to challenges 
posed by technology and online speech.
Peace mobiliser and counter-messaging
At the same time, digital technology can 
play an important role in confronting and 
challenging hateful messages and incitement 
to violence. 
In 2007/08, social media was used to promote 
peace and safeguard against the spread of hate 
speech. Re-tweets allowed users to voice their 
agreement with a news item or opinion, and 
popular tweets spread quickly through cascade 
effects. Hashtags also played a role in online 
peace promotion.
Counter-speech, defined as crowd-sourced 
responses to dangerous content, was also 
popular following the 2013 elections. Individual 
users as well as broadcasters used platforms 
such as Twitter and Facebook to spread 
positive messages and encourage people to 
remain calm. Messages promoting peace were 
also circulated through SMS.
Some regulators and service providers have 
taken further steps to tackle hate speech or 
incitement. In the lead up to the 2013 elections, 
Kenya’s Communications Authority sought 
to regulate bulk SMS messaging by requiring 
providers to screen content for dangerous 
speech. Mobile service providers blocked an 
estimated 300,000 text messages per day, 
suspected to contain hate speech. However, 
this process of blocking content was not 
transparent and decisions were not subject to 
review by public bodies to allow for democratic 
scrutiny and to ensure citizens’ rights to 
freedom of expression were not violated.
Documenter and forecaster of violence
Social media and digital technology can 
also be used to document and forecast 
violence. Digital technology has been used to 
document, model and predict violence using 
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“Digital 
technology 
can play an 
important role 
in confronting 
and challenging 
hateful messages 
and incitement 
to violence.”
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“While 
social media 
and digital 
technology can 
play a variety 
of positive and 
negative roles 
in crises, they 
are also limited 
by issues of 
inclusion and 
representation.”
crowdsourced platforms in contexts including 
Eastern DR Congo and Syria, where media 
and researchers typically have limited access. 
In Kenya, Facebook pages such as ‘Elections 
Iwitness Kenya’ and ‘Kenya Elections 2013’ 
were established before the 2013 elections 
with the aim of allowing users to share 
accounts of electoral conduct. WhatsApp 
has also been instrumental in sharing videos, 
pictures and information during crises. 
Similarly, since 2007, custom-built initiatives 
have encouraged citizens to report and 
document violence using online platforms, 
including sharing videos and photos. This has 
enabled analysts to track and verify reported 
violence, identify flashpoints, and forward 
credible accounts to responders.
In addition to monitoring actual violence, digital 
technology can be used for early warning: in 
preparation for the 2017 elections, The Sentinel 
Project and iHub Research have created Una 
Hakika (‘Are you sure?’), a mobile phone-based 
service that monitors the spread of rumours 
and acts to contain them. Subscribers can 
report rumours through text messages or 
by talking to trained volunteer community 
ambassadors. The well-known Ushahidi platform 
will also crowdsource reports of insecurity in 
the 2017 elections. In both systems, reports 
relating to actual or rumoured violence are 
filtered and referred to responders for action. 
However, acting on reports often depends 
on the extent to which initiatives are joined 
up to, and have the support of, relevant 
responder groups.
Digital technology: Whose voice?
While social media and digital technology can 
play a variety of positive and negative roles 
in crises, they are also limited by issues of 
inclusion and representation.
In Kenya, despite relatively high levels of 
internet and smartphone use, the majority of 
people do not have regular internet access, 
and SMS is expensive for the poor. Unequal 
digital technology infrastructure across the 
country, and differential use according to 
age, income and education, can limit the 
representativeness and inclusiveness of these 
technologies. 
Different interpretations of what constitutes 
violence may also mean certain forms of 
violence are systematically under-reported. 
Intimate partner and criminal violence may not 
be routinely captured in systems designed for 
early warning in political crises, but evidence 
suggests these phenomena are inter-related, 
as patterns of gender-based violence, for 
example, are often correlated to wider unrest.
Equally, the political context matters: suspicion 
and distrust of security and intelligence 
services could lead to reluctance to share 
information on platforms that are actively 
monitored, due to concerns that it could be 
leaked or misused.
These factors hinder users’ ability to engage 
with these platforms, including contributing 
to positive digital initiatives to promote 
peace. This can also produce biases in the data 
collected and used to inform early warning 
and crisis response. 
Therefore, if policymakers and practitioners 
rely primarily on social media and digital 
platforms for violence reporting, many people 
experiencing violence may be silenced and 
typically affluent, urban, young, literate voices 
may be further amplified. Initiatives gathering 
data through digital platforms and social media 
should be used in conjunction with other 
reporting pathways that specifically seek to 
correct for potential exclusion effects.
Digital technology – The 5 A’s
Five factors effectively exclude many people from full use of 
digital technology: 
1. Availability: In many contexts, a large portion of the 
population live in remote areas where digital technology 
and social media are simply not available.
2. Affordability: Even where available, it may not be 
affordable for many people.
3. Awareness: Even when affordable, people may lack 
awareness of its presence or its use; or of particular 
initiatives (e.g., in violence reporting systems).
4. Ability: Among groups that are aware, some people may 
lack the ability to effectively use technologies due to digital 
literacy skills.
5. Accessibility: Even where those conditions are met, 
accessibility can still exclude people from participation: for 
example, platforms may exclude minority language groups.
As a consequence, marginalised groups may be systematically 
excluded from full digital participation, even though these 
groups are vulnerable to violence. The extent of this exclusion, 
and its effects on the accuracy of violence reporting in Kenya 
specifically, remain largely unknown.
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Recommendations
• Donors, government and civil society should support initiatives that promote 
locally legitimate peace messaging and counter-speech as means of 
confronting incitement to violence on open platforms, but increasingly 
popular closed messaging systems require more innovative and inclusive 
strategies: Community-based counter-speech is an effective means of 
challenging and confronting hate speech and incitement to violence, leveraging 
popular opinion and promoting greater awareness of inclusive and democratic 
engagement. However, closed messaging systems, such as WhatsApp, are 
increasingly popular in Kenya, and are not subject to the same public oversight. 
Addressing incitement to violence and hate speech on these platforms requires 
more innovative and collaborative responses to generate more widespread 
public support, in contexts where official monitoring and response is limited. 
Options include efforts to encourage users to pro-actively counter hateful 
messages in closed messaging systems, and generating broad-based support for 
community-based counter-messaging.
• Guidelines by government and the private sector aimed at monitoring or 
regulating online speech should be transparent and accountable in judging 
what constitutes dangerous speech or incitement, so as to secure wide 
popular support and buy-in: Attempts to monitor, regulate and prosecute 
online hate or dangerous speech have had limited success to date. This is due 
in part to technical challenges of responding to online activity, but also related 
to issues of political will and public credibility. Despite the fact that the NCIC 
has developed a set of guidelines linked to hate speech legislation, there is a 
need for increased collaboration with media practitioners and civil society to 
improve transparency and accountability. It is vital for public support and wider 
civil society buy-in that any efforts to monitor, regulate, prosecute or prevent 
certain speech online be based on transparent, accountable and openly debated 
parameters for determining what constitutes an infringement, so freedom of 
speech and legitimate critique is not impeded.  
• Government and civil society initiatives to monitor and track violence 
using digital technologies should be used in conjunction with other 
monitoring initiatives and reporting pathways: Digital platforms and social 
media monitoring can generate huge volumes of data at rapid speed, but the 
accuracy and reliability of that data is impeded in part by underlying inequalities 
in access, use, and representation. Policymakers relying on digital monitoring 
systems should invest in triangulation methods that effectively combine multiple 
and targeted reporting pathways to overcome geographic, demographic and 
economic differentials in digital access and use. Options include combining 
digital reporting with systematic media monitoring, networks of on-the-ground 
reporters, or targeted reporting initiatives such as those that document 
sexual- and gender-based violence, or those that actively engage digitally 
under-represented groups.
